Abortion defenders explain why Roe v. Wade was a terrible legal decision
Roe v. Wade — which ruled that the U.S. Constitution effectively mandates a nationwide policy of abortion on demand — is one of the most widely criticized Supreme Court decisions in America history.As Villanova law professor Joseph W. Dellapenna writes, “The opinion [in Roe] is replete with irrelevancies, non-sequiturs, and unsubstantiated assertions. The Court decides matters it disavows any intention of deciding—thereby avoiding any need to defend its conclusion. In the process the opinion simply fails to convince.”
Even many scholars sympathetic to the results of Roe have issued harsh criticisms of its legal reasoning. In the Yale Law Journal, eminent legal scholar John Hart Ely, a supporter of legal abortion, complained that Roe is “bad constitutional law, or rather … it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.” He wrote:
“What is unusual about Roe
is that the liberty involved is accorded … a protection more stringent,
I think it is fair to say, than that the present Court accords the
freedom of the press explicitly guaranteed by the First Amendment. What
is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is
not inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers’
thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value
derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation’s
governmental structure. Nor is it explainable in terms of the unusual
political impotence of the group judicially protected vis-a-vis the
interests that legislatively prevailed over it. And that, I believe … is
a charge that can responsibly be leveled at no other decision of the
past twenty years. At times the inferences the Court has drawn from the
values the Constitution marks for special protection have been
controversial, even shaky, but never before has its sense of an
obligation to draw one been so obviously lacking.”
“One of the most curious things
about Roe is that, behind its own verbal smokescreen, the substantive
judgment on which it rests is nowhere to be found.” — Laurence H. Tribe, Harvard law professor
“As a matter of constitutional
interpretation and judicial method, Roe borders on the indefensible. I
say this as someone utterly committed to the right to choose. … Justice
Blackmun’s opinion provides essentially no reasoning in support of its
holding. And in the … years since Roe’s announcement, no one has
produced a convincing defense of Roe on its own terms.” — Edward Lazarus, former clerk to Justice Harry Blackmun
“The failure to confront the
issue in principled terms leaves the opinion to read like a set of
hospital rules and regulations. … Neither historian, nor layman, nor
lawyer will be persuaded that all the prescriptions of Justice Blackmun
are part of the Constitution.” — Archibald Cox, Harvard law professor, former U.S. Solicitor General
“[I]t is time to admit in public
that, as an example of the practice of constitutional opinion writing,
Roe is a serious disappointment. You will be hard-pressed to find a
constitutional law professor, even among those who support the idea of
constitutional protection for the right to choose, who will embrace the
opinion itself rather than the result. This is not surprising. As a
constitutional argument, Roe is barely coherent. The court pulled its
fundamental right to choose more or less from the constitutional ether.” — Kermit Roosevelt, University of Pennsylvania law professor
“Roe, I believe, would have been
more acceptable as a judicial decision if it had not gone beyond a
ruling on the extreme statute before the Court. … Heavy-handed judicial
intervention was difficult to justify and appears to have provoked, not
resolved, conflict.” — Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
“In the Court’s first
confrontation with the abortion issue, it laid down a set of rules for
legislatures to follow. The Court decided too many issues too quickly.
The Court should have allowed the democratic processes of the states to
adapt and to generate sensible solutions that might not occur to a set
of judges.” — Cass Sunstein, University of Chicago law professor
“Judges have no special
competence, qualifications, or mandate to decide between equally
compelling moral claims (as in the abortion controversy). … [C]lear
governing constitutional principles … are not present [in Roe].” — Alan Dershowitz, Harvard law professor
“[O]verturning [Roe] would be the
best thing that could happen to the federal judiciary. … Thirty years
after Roe, the finest constitutional minds in the country still have not
been able to produce a constitutional justification for striking down
restrictions on early-term abortions that is substantially more
convincing than Justice Harry Blackmun’s famously artless opinion
itself.” — Jeffrey Rosen, legal commentator, George Washington University law professor
“Blackmun’s [Supreme Court]
papers vindicate every indictment of Roe: invention, overreach,
arbitrariness, textual indifference.” — William Saletan, Slate columnist, writing in Legal Affairs
“In the years since the decision
an enormous body of academic literature has tried to put the right to an
abortion on firmer legal ground. But thousands of pages of scholarship
notwithstanding, the right to abortion remains constitutionally shaky. …
[Roe] is a lousy opinion that disenfranchised millions of conservatives
on an issue about which they care deeply.” — Benjamin Wittes, Brookings Institution fellow
“Although I am pro-choice, I was
taught in law school, and still believe, that Roe v. Wade is a muddle of
bad reasoning and an authentic example of judicial overreaching.” — Michael Kinsley, columnist, writing in the Washington Post.
Source: NRLC News
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